Vol. 5 No. 3

NASA Reviews New Launch Initiatives

Evaluating the errors of the failed X-33 project and reviewing NASA"s Space Launch Initiative (SLI), members of the House Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics heard testimonies June 20^th from NASA Administrators and a representative from the General Accountant"s Office.

The hearing opened with Subcommittee Chairman, Representative Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA) restating the purpose of the SLI, that being to create a "safe and reliable" mode of space transportation with the "removal [of] scientific and commercial barriers."

In the first testimony, Dennis Smith, Program Manager of Marshal Space Flight Center, emphasized NASA"s new "bottoms up" approach to the SLI. Smith explained that rather than designing and building a preconceived vehicle, the agency instead plans to spend approximately five years creating a "toolbox" of advanced technology. After these five years, NASA will analyze its current technological status and mold the RLV design after the newly synthesized advancements.

Representative Marc Gordon (D-TN), wary of NASA"s X-33 failure, asked Mr. Smith "At the end of five years, what is our measure of success?" Smith concluded that if successful, then NASA will have the tools and data available to reach informed decisions. In short, he asserted that success equates to "we know we can pay for it and build it."

Mr. Smith also announced the awarding of 22 commercial contracts worth 800 million dollars for the development of RLV-applicable technology, such as innovative airframe technologies and advanced thermal protection services. NASA hopes that this commercial participation will " maintain competition in key areas to assure the best, most innovative ideas going."

Following questioning from Representative Roscoe Bartlett (R-MD), Mr. Smith said that NASA aims to converge the civil requirements with commercial and military capabilities, so that "rate goes up, cost comes down." Smith mentioned that the agency hopes to minimize the current $10,000 per pound of payload cost to $1,000 per pound.

Mr. Allen Li, Director of Acquisition and Sourcing Management for the General Accounting Office then testified on two key issues: the causes of X-33"s failure and how to eliminate these problems in future programs.

Mr.Li first criticized NASA for poor risk management, lack of proper government oversight, and its failure to conduct cost proper assessment throughout the evolution of the X-33 program. Mr. Li explained that NASA correctly assumed that Lockheed Martin had been coordinating risk analysis, which evaluates cost, scheduling, and technical aspects of projects, but NASA had not been conducting these valuable assessments themselves. For the future, Mr.Li suggested more formal government reviews.

Li also advised open communication between the contractors and NASA regarding project structure and risk reduction activities and suggested establishing performance measures that can evaluate the progress of each component of the SLI. Finally, Mr. Li commented that one of the crucial elements determining the success of SLI is adequate funding. As long as NASA performs sufficient cost estimates and follows through with its risk mitigation plans, Mr. Li predicted success.

During his questioning, Representative George Nethercutt (R-WA) expressed concerns, based upon the Administration"s performances in the X-33 program and International Space Station, toward NASA"s risk mitigation plan, and agreed with Mr. Li that extensive cost oversight is mandatory.

In addition Chairman Rohrabacher exclaimed in frustration that maybe even the committee was to blame for a lack of oversight. Perhaps they too, the House subcommittee members, should have played a more parental role in the X-33 program.

In testimony, Steve Hoeser, advisor to the Department of Defense"s (DoD) single-stage-to-orbit program, was critical of NASA"s current "bottoms up" approach to the SLI. Citing his experience in developing DoD"s "world"s first fully reusable rocket", the Delta Clipper Experimental, Mr. Hoeser explained that the "classic rapid program approach" proves more effective. This approach ensures that the project"s objective is to "develop a capability." This involves fabricating a structure based upon current technology easily available and accessible, while only "dipping into the advanced technology bucket as needed."

Hoeser blamed NASA"s new approach upon former President Clinton, who in the 1994 National Space Transportation Policy directed NASA to shift focus. As a result, NASA works to "demonstrate technologies, not demonstrate capabilities." Mr.Hoeser also questioned the ability of NASA to develop technology strategically without an understanding of the goal, or of the vehicle attempting to be produced.

He urged the subcommittee to avoid blaming NASA or Lockheed Martin for the X-33 program and suggested that all parties involved need to "fix the problem, not the blame."

Mr. Hoeser recommended conducting independently managed RLV design studies. The results can be used determine which technological research demands more time, resources, and attention. As a result, both NASA and the corporate sector can "prioritize efforts."

Representative Dave Weldon (R-FLA) questioned, "So, no vehicle? Just validation of technology?" Mr. Hoeser reiterated his unease with this approach and underscored his conviction that a specific vehicle design must be created first.

Mr. Tom Rogers, Chief Scientist of the Space Transportation Association, gave an extensive discourse on four changes that he feels must occur for SLI to be a success:

An immediate and "active Federal presence" in the space transportation area is imperative. Only with federal assistance, Mr. Rogers claimed, can the needs of the commercial industry be met. For example, Mr. Rogers recognized that a form of orbiting housing will be needed to support the civilian space travelers. To meet this need, he suggests the acquisition of International Space Station Federal housing.

Also, Mr. Rogers recommended that the Departments of Commerce and of Transportation diligently work to encourage commercial investment in Low Earth Orbit involvement. Mr. Rogers cited a FAA report that states that space transportation generates $60 billion dollars in revenue, and he challenged the committee members to imagine that figure if space tourism and commercial projects were involved.

His testimony also endorsed the expansion of SLI"s "Alternative Access", in which creative and entreprenuereal solutions to LEO tourism are developed. In essence, Mr. Rogers feels that with innovation, the space tourism market to LEO could easily be likened to commercial airlines.

Lastly, to facilitate this private sector growth, Rogers suggested that Congress allow NASA to focus on Mars and Lunar missions, leaving LEO to commercial ventures. To do so, Mr. Rogers advocates a Moon-Mars line item in the NASA budget. In theory, the commercial investments will generate such great wealth that government taxes eventually will not be needed to finance the more probing space explorations to the Moon and Mars.

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By Lauren LaRue, NSS Summer 01 Policy Intern